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Comments and Casenotes
STATUTORY SOLUTION OF UNCERTAINTY AS
TO FACT AND TIME OF DEATH.
Lachowicz v. Lechowicz'
Decedent, an unmarried male resident of Baltimore
City, died therein intestate in 1941, leaving an estate consisting of $30,000.00 in accumulated War Risk Insurance.
The Baltimore National Bank was appointed administrator,
and it instituted proper proceedings 2 in the Orphan's Court
of Baltimore City to ascertain who was entitled to distribution. Two cousins, residents of Baltimore, appeared and
claimed as next of kin. There was proof that the decedent
had a brother, who returned to Poland from the United
States in 1914 and who had last been heard from in Poland
in 1937. There was doubt whether the brother was still
living, and if dead, when he had died. There was also
doubt whether there were any children of the brother ever
born, and, if so, whether they survived. The Polish Consul
General, acting under an applicable treaty, appeared on
behalf of the brother and opposed distribution to the
cousins.
The Orphan's Court ordered distribution to the cousins,
and the Consul General appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered the fund paid into court under a
statute of 19411 which permits an administrator or executor, where the estate is not susceptible of distribution, to
pay the fund into court to be held seven years subject to
the proof of claims by any one entitled to it, failing which
by the end of seven years the fund goes to the School
Board. The Court of Appeals found that, for the cousins
to prevail, they would have to prove that the brother in
Poland had died, without descendants, prior to the death
of the decedent. There was no proof of this, nor any presumption of such facts. Quite the contrary, a presumption
of continuance of the brother's life arose from the proof
of his still being alive in 1937. The counter common law
presumption of death from seven years absence from home,
130 A. (2d) 793 (Md., 1943). One branch of the family spelled the
name Lachowicz, and the other Lechowicz, hence the confusion in the
names of the parties to the case.
2 Under Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 151.
3 Md. Laws 1941, Ch. 726, to be Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 16, Sec.
233A_
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unheard of, was held inapplicable for several reasons (not
to mention the fact that seven years had not run from
1937 to either 1941 or 1942), i. e., that the presumption would
merely show the fact of being dead, not death on a given
date prior to the end of the period; even if applicable
it would not show death without issue; and the essential
foundation in fact for such presumption, i. e., absence from
home, had not been shown. Quite to the contrary, the
brother had last been heard from at his home in Poland.
The common law presumption itself only arises when the
foundation fact of absence from normal surroundings,
unheard from, is first shown.
The principal case is interesting for several reasons.
Aside from the fact that the complications of proof concerning the Polish brother's existence arose from the terrors of the current global war, itself starting in Poland
where he was last heard from, it brings into focus several
legal propositions, some of considerable antiquity, and several enacted at the 1941 session of the Maryland legislature,4 specifically calculated to deal with an omni-present
legal difficulty, the resolution of uncertainties as to the fact
and time of death.
These common law and statutory rules have been variously concerned with the solution of three subsidiary types
of uncertainty as to human death, the sequence of which
will be followed herein.'
I There were four enacted in 1941, the one mentioned in the preceding
footnote; Ch. 771, to be Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 93, Sec. 151A; Ch. 857,
to be Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 16, Secs. 280A-280M; and Ch. 191, to be
Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 16, Secs. 89-96.
The last two of the above statutes adopted at the 1941 session were Uniform Acts, the Uniform Absent Persons Act, and the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act. It is interesting to note the handling of these two problems
by ,the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Originally, the Commissioners considered the two problems as one, under the heading "Presumption of Death", see 1933 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 43, 292, mentioning the original recommendation for the Commissioners to take up the matter, found in 1932
Handbook, 174. By 1934, the project had already split up into its two
present forms, although both were still being considered together, 1934
Handbook, 47; as they were in 1935 Handbook. 48, 136, 158; 1936 Handbook, 51, 106, 223; and 1937 Handbook, 58, 236. The two are treated,
some jointly, some severally, in 1938 Handbook, 59, 184, 204, 276, 281, 286,
294; and 1939 Handbook, 75, 191, 196, 201, 209. The Commissioners approved the Absent Persons Act in 1939, and the Simultaneous Death Act
in 1940. Since then the former has been adopted in 3 states, including
Maryland; and the latter in 18 states, including Maryland. Further references to the two are found in 1940 Handbook, 90, 92, 96, 181, 267; and 1941
Handbook, 79, 81, 94, 184. The only references in the 1942 Handbook
are at pages 334-335, giving the numbers of adoptions indicated above.
6 The vague presumption against the commission of suicide, which one
sees occasionally applied to situations where the cause of death is in
doubt, might be mentioned at this point.
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One is the matter of determining the fact vel non of
a person's being dead at the time of the litigation, or as
of some prior time, the exact date of the death being immaterial, where there is suspicion, but not proof of the
prior death of the particular person.
Second is the question of exactly fixing the date of the
death of a person, the fact of his being dead either known
or assumed, where there is no sufficient proof of the date.
This the law has done the least about.
Third is that of establishing the relative dates or times
of two or more deaths, both or all of which are known
to have happened in fact, but where there is doubt or uncertainty as to the sequence of the particular deaths. The
last named problem typically arises from multiple deaths
in a common disaster, although, as will be pointed out,
it can equally well arise from the fact of two or more
deaths happening around the same time but not resulting
from the same incident.
The various specific past and present Maryland case
and statutory rules which are to be discussed, in the order
of the above three headings, can be enumerated as follows:
(A) The common law presumption of continuance of life
shown once to have been in existence; (B) The common
law presumption of death from seven years absence, unheard from; (C) The 1941 Maryland version of the Uniform Absent Persons Act; (D) the now superseded Maryland procedure for probating the estate of a person absent
unheard from for seven years; (E) the now superseded
Maryland statute allowing the remaining spouse to convey
property acquired during the seven year absence of the
other; (F) the 1941 Maryland statute requiring money to
be paid into court when the estate is incapable of distribution, and, as well, certain earlier similar Maryland statutes not repealed by the 1941 one; (G) the 1941 Maryland
statute allowing money to be paid into court if non-resident beneficiaries would not come into full control of it;
(H) the seven years absence saving clause of the bigamy
statute, and the problem of mistaken belief in actual death
of an absent spouse; (I) the presumption of termination
of a first and impediment marriage in order to save the
civil validity of a second marriage otherwise void for
bigamy; (J) the lack of any general common law provision
for settling the exact date of a single death known or
assumed to have happened sometime; (K) the common
law rule that there is no presumption of survivorship in
the case of deaths in a common disaster; (L) the 1920
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Maryland statute setting up arbitrary presumptions of such
survivorship; that last now replaced by (M) the 1941
Maryland version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
The law's technique for handling these problems has
traditionally been that of presumptions and special burdens
of proof, although recent statutes take other steps. Hence
a few words as to the theory of presumptions and burdens
may be in order. Presumptions, as devices of the law of
evidence, seek to aid the cause of the utmost accuracy in
jury verdicts by the avoidance of situations wherein the
jurors may be confused into rendering inaccurate verdicts.
To be sure, most of the rules of evidence are concerned
with the problem of trustworthiness, of keeping the jury
from being overly impressed with inaccurate and incredible
testimony. Still another important group of evidential
rules are not concerned with jury verdicts at all, but serve
extrinsic social policies, excluding evidence for the other
objectives. Thus we have the privileges, and the rules of
official secrecy.
But, an important group of rules of evidence exclude
or regulate the production of perfectly trustworthy evidence on the theory that the jury may be confused by it,
even though trustworthy, and render inaccurate verdicts,
nonetheless. Thus the rules restricting the impeachment
of witnesses, those as to the order of producing testimony,
the character rule, and the rules against remote and prejudicial evidence all attempt to serve the objective of avoidance of jury confusion variously by keeping down the bulk
of the case, by avoiding unduly attractive issues and evidence, and by providing for the production of proof in the
most orderly and least confusing fashion. Rules of presumption and of burden of proof attempt to serve those
policies and, as well seek to avoid a fourth danger particularly rampant in the presently treated issue of death, the
jury's being confused by being balked by an issue actually
not capable of being solved.
To be sure, many presumptions are concerned with
other objectives than the one last stated., Some, based
on probabilities, merely seek to keep down the bulk of the
case by presuming the obvious and by making it unnecessary to confuse the jury by adding to the bulk. Others
seek to avoid thus weighing down the case by presuming
a fact to the disadvantage of the party most likely to
possess the clearest evidence, thus compelling him to bring
it in and so have the issue resolved in the least confusing
fashion.
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But the rules we are now concerned with really serve
the last sub-policy of avoiding jury confusion, that of making an artificial solution of an issue otherwise likely to be
incapable of solution in normal fashion by the jury. This
is done to the end that they may not waste too much time
in speculation about the insoluble issue, to the detriment
of their attention to the other issues they are capable of
normally solving. These rules principally purport artificially to solve an issue in order that the case may be
wound up, it being impossible to know exactly what is
the correct answer.
By far the greater number of the legal devices now
being discussed are concerned with the solving the first
type of uncertainty which was enumerated above, i. e.,
the question of the death vel non of a given person at
the time of the litigation, or at another time, the exact
date not itself being material.
With reference to the question, is a certain person already dead at the time of the pending litigation, or as of
some earlier time, the common law itself worked out two
conflicting presumptions, both discussed in the principal
case. One was a presumption of continuance of life from
a showing that the person in question was earlier still
alive, barring evidence contra or a stronger presumption.'
Thus, in the principal case, the fact of the brother's having
been heard from in 1937 created a presumption, adverse
to the cousins' claim, that he was still alive in 1941 when
decedent died. Contra this (although properly found inapplicable to this case) is the presumption of death from
seven year's absence from home, unheard from when it
would be likely that the subject would have been heard
from if still alive.
But, as the Court pointed out in the principal case, the
use of this presumption requires preliminary proof of being
absent from home for those seven years, whereas the person in question was last heard from at his home in Poland,
and there was not one whit of evidence that he had ever
6 Shriver and Dwyer v. State, use of Reister, 65 Md. 278, 4 A. 679 (1886) ;
Schaub v. Griffin, 84 Md. 557, 36 A. 443 (1897) ; Robb v. Horsey, 169 Md.
227, 181 A. 348 (1935). On the other hand, consider also the following
cases, mostly of ejectment, where, to entitle claimant to legal title to sue,
proof of the death of intermediate heirs from lapse of inordinate time had to
be presumed even without proof of disappearance: Kelso v. Stigar, 75 Md.
376, 24 A. 18 (1892) ; Sprigg v. Moale, 28 Md. 497 (1868) ; Hammond v.
Inloes, 4 Md. 138 (1853); Peterkin v. Inloes, 4 Md. 175 (1853) ; Lee v.
Hoye, 1 Gill 188 (1840); Stevenson v. Howard, 3 H. & J. 554 (1808);
Thomas v. Visitors, 7 G. & J. 369, 385 (1835) ; and Liquidation of George's
Creek Co., 125 Md. 595, 604, 94 A. 209 (1915).
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been absent therefrom. Furthermore, his not being heard
from in this country since 1939 (only two years after last
heard from) is well explained by the fact that the Germans
overran Poland in that year and communications with the
outside world ceased.7
For that matter, even if the presumption were otherwise applicable, all that it would accomplish would be to
presume that the subject was dead at the time of trial,
or was in fact dead at the end of the seven year period;
not that he died at any particular time during the period."
This was pointed out in Robb v. Horsey,9 another recent
Maryland case. In the principal case it was necessary (in
order that the cousins might prevail) to show that the
brother died within two years after he was last heard
from and, too, that he was then not survived by descendants
who would take ahead of the Baltimore cousins. There
is no presumption at all to help solve a question of whether
a person is survived by descendants. 10
The common law presumption of death from seven
years' absence, insofar as it can be helpful within the common law limits, still survives in Maryland for litigation
generally but, by a statute passed in 1941, it was abolished
for purposes of a novel type of proceeding then established,
now to be dealt with. This proceeding would have had no
application to the absent brother's interests in the principal
case, and so the Court's opinion made no reference to it.
The 1941 legislature (by Chapter 857, to be Article 16,
Sections 280A-280M) adopted the "Uniform Absence as
Evidence of Death and Absentee's Property Act" (alias
"Uniform Absent Persons Act") and established for Maryland this complicated (although sensible) technique for
handling the problem of the disappearance of persons domiciled in Maryland who have property interests. Inasmuch
as the absent brother was not domiciled in Maryland in
the principal case, the statute had no application, nor could
it have applied until it were first established that an absent
person was entitled to the particular property interest,
Another excellent example of one's disappearance being explained on
some other basis than his death is found in Robb v. Horsey, 8upra, n. 6,
where a husband disappeared, and two years later was encountered by his
wife in another city in the company of another woman who had also disappeared. He was then not heard from for another 13 years. The Court
held that his absence was explained on another basis than his death, i. e.,
his determination to hide from his family.
'See text infra, circa n. 30, et 8eq. for elaboration of this point.
Supra, n. 6.
10 On which see the following cases, supra, n. 6: Robb v. Horsey; Shriver
and Dwyer v. State, use of Reister; Liquidation of George's Creek Co.;
Sprigg v. Moale; Hammond v. Inloes; and Peterkin v. Inloes.
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which, of course, was at issue in the case, and still is, possibly for seven years.
The newly enacted statute, in addition to setting up
the procedure outlined below, specifically supersedes the
previous provisions of Article 93, Section 243,11 for probating the estates of persons who have been absent unheard of for seven years. It also repeals that part of
Article 45, Section 13,12 which permitted a conveyance,
as if unmarried, by a spouse whose other spouse had been
absent unheard of for seven years, of any real property
acquired since the beginning of such absence. The principal contribution of the new statute is to make provision
for the handling of the absentee's property during his
absence, in addition to setting up procedure for having
him declared "legally dead" in due course if the absence
continues long enough for that. In proceedings under this
statute, no presumption of death or its date arises from
absence, but it is merely a fact issue to go to the jury,
although it is provided that exposure to a specific peril
shall be sufficient to take the case to the jury, or to be considered by a judge without a jury, on the issue of death
in fact. Provision is made that insurance policy clauses
concerning absence shall be void. There is another provision fixing limitations for suits on policies on the lives
of absent persons.
The salient feature of the act is the one for the appointment of a receiver for the property of a person domiciled
in Maryland who has disappeared, upon the petition of a
creditor, surety, insurer, or other person having an interest
in the absentee's property if deceased. A distinction is
made between a temporary and a permanent receiver. The
receiver is empowered to manage the property of the absentee broadly, to support dependents, collect obligations,
handle property, and so on. The absentee is given notice
by publication of the proceedings, and others concerned
are also notified.13 Provision is made for making search
for the absentee.
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 243, had, in the part deleted by Md.
Laws 1941, Ch. 857, provided an elaborate procedure for probating in the
Orphans' Courts the estates of persons supposed to be dead, on the basis
of their seven years absence from their Maryland domiciles, unheard from.
See 19 Car. 2, Cap. 6, 2 Alex. Br. Stat. (Coe's Ed., 1912) *499.
12 There still remains in Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 13, the provision
permitting the spouse of one held lunatic or insane by inquisition to convey
as if unmarried any real estate acquired since the finding of such inquisition.
11 It could be suggested that the Uniform Absent Persons Act might provide a useful device for handling the problem whether members of the
armed services reported as "missing" are in fact dead, so that their Mary-
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If, at any time during the proceedings, the court finds
the absentee to be actually dead, this fact is to be certified
to the Orphan's Court, and his estate will thereupon be
administered on the basis of death in fact. If no such
finding is made within five years after the proceedings
are instituted, and the absentee does not appear, the court
may then declare the interest of the absentee in the property to have ceased, and that it has devolved upon others,
either upon the basis of intestacy if there was no will,
or to those who would take under any will left by the
absentee, and the receiver so distributes.
14
The absentee is barred by final finding under the act,
except that, where the property shall be distributed after
five years for lack of proof of death, he is protected by an
Insurance Fund administered by the State, and supported
by payments to be deducted from the amounts to be distributed to those who shall take under such distributions.
This provision for reimbursing absentees who reappear
after distribution of their property without proof of actual
death was put in, no doubt, to avoid constitutional objection to any system lacking some such protection. In fact,
the Maryland Court of Appeals once held unconstitutional
an earlier version of the now superseded Article 93, Section 243, for lack of any protection to the absentee should
he reappear. 15 That section
had been later changed to
6
provide such protection..
With reference to insurance policies on the life of the
absentee, the companies may pay off voluntarily in reland property may be administered under its provisions. But quaere,
will its use in such cases be precluded by the Soldiers and Sailors Civil
Relief Acts, 54 Stat. 1178, 50 U. S. C. 501-585; and Md. Laws 1941, Ch. 710,
Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 87A. Both 50 U. S. C. 581 (3), and Md. Laws
1941, Ch. 710, Sec. 18 (3) provide that a person reported missing "shall
be presumed to continue in service until accounted for", etc.
14The statute is obscure on this point. Section 280G provides:
"No
action shall be brought by an absentee to recover any portion of this property after the final finding and judgment provided for in Section 280F."
But, Section 280F provides for alternative "final findings", (1) that the
absentee is in fact dead, and (2) that he has not appeared after five years.
The Insurance Fund for the protection of absentees who appear only
covers mistaken distribution under (2). Quaere, does the statute mean
to bar absentees, without reimbursement, where their estates are probated
on mistaken proof of actual death, rather than on mere presumptive death
from absence. If so, is it constitutional? It is beyond the scope of this
note to deal with the previous Maryland law as to the situation of the
parties where an estate is probated on mistaken proof of actual death.
11Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Weeks, 103 Md. 601, 64 A. 295, 6 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 690 (1906).
"Held constitutional in Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Weeks, 110 Md.
78, 72 A. 475, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221 (1909).
See, for a case involving
the detail of the earlier statute, without question of its constitutionality,
Lee v. Allen, 100 Md. 7, 59 A. 184 (1904).
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liance on the proceedings for receivership. If they contest, the issue of the absentee's death is to be submitted
to a jury. If death be found, the companies then pay off
as the policies indicate, otherwise the surrender value of
the policies is taken and properly distributed.
The procedure under the Uniform Absent Persons Act,
just discussed, is a way of resolving any uncertainty as
to the death of a Marylander who is known to own property. A second statute passed at the 1941 session (Chapter
726, to be Article 16, Section 233A), which is the one applied in the principal case, resolves in its way, uncertainty
as to the survival of any person entitled, if he survived,
to receive under the administration of a Maryland estate.
It does this by permitting the executor, administrator, or
other fiduciary under Orphan's Court jurisdiction, to pay
the money into court and discharge himself; and it gives
claimants to the fund seven years to muster their proof,
failing which the fund reverts to the State by way of the
local School Board.
This statute of 1941 was supplemental of several already on the books and found in Article 16, Sections 231
through 238, which made various provisions for controlling
distribution by fiduciaries where the beneficiaries were
either unknown,' or, in the case of life tenants, had not
appeared for seven year periods, 8 or were not certainly
known to be residents of the State. 9 The 1941 statute
immediately supplements Article 16, Section 233,20 calling
for payment over to the School Board of funds held for
a seven year period by a fiduciary, where the beneficiary,
or his legal successors, have not been able to be located
within seven years. 2' The 1941 statute is an improvement
in that it makes it unnecessary for the fiduciary to keep
the estate open during the seven year period. But a differ1? Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 231. This permits any fiduciary, when
he has reason to apprehend that persons living unknown to him may be
entitled to share in the property, to apply to a court of equity to assume
jurisdiction over the property, and to direct its distribution.
'a Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 232. This supplements Section 231,
mentioned in the preceding footnote, and provides for a fiduciary's paying
to a remainderman where a life tenant has not appeared and claimed his
interest for a period of seven years after a court of Equity assumed jurisdiction. As under Section 231, the fiduciary is protected against claims by
the life tenant and his representatives if the life tenant later be disclosed
to have survived.
10 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Secs. 235, 236.
20 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 233. Ibid., See. 234, provides for repaying the money to claimants if and when they appear.
11Consider the general provisions for escheated property going to the
School Boards, Md. Code (1939) Art. 46, Sec. 47; and Ibid., Art. 93, Secs.
r
143-144.
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ence seems suggested, i. e., that Section 233 applies where
it is known that the beneficiary (or some one under him)
survived to acquire an interest in the fund, whereas Section 233A is broad enough to cover both that and the Lachowicz situation, i. e., an uncertainty as to who is the beneficiary, due to uncertainty as to fact and time of death of
a given person who is the beneficiary only if he lived long
enough. Quaere, whether Section 233 may not be partly
superseded by the Uniform Absent Persons Act if the
known and certain beneficiary, having disappeared, is a
domiciled Marylander?22
An equally salutary type of statute was the third one
passed at the 1941 session (Chapter 771, to be Article 93,
Section 151A).
This, while not concerned with uncertainty as to the fact of death, yet might have been (or
may yet be) involved in the Lachowicz case. It also uses
the same technique of the second 1941 statute mentioned
above. This provides for paying into court any funds to
be distributed to non-residents of the United States who
would not obtain full benefit and control of the funds because of international or national action (other than that
of the United States). The primary objective of this is
to avoid funds distributed in Maryland litigation coming
into the hands of those subject to Nazi and Fascist domination and confiscation. It also copes with the war-time
23
restrictions on the international transmission of money.
Uncertainty as to death vel non has also given difficulty in the area of marriage and divorce law, here with
reference to the problem, was a person dead in fact prior
to a certain date prior to litigation. The Maryland bigamy
statute has a saving clause protecting from criminal conviction a married person who marries another when the
first spouse has been absent seven years unheard from.2 4
Should the absent spouse actually appear, or be proved to
have survived the date of the second marriage, however,
22 Mention should be made in this connection of the problem of unclaimed bank deposits. Md. Code (1939) Art. 11, Sees. 47-48, requires
reports from savings institutions to the Bank Commissioner of accounts
inactive for more than twenty years of persons not known to be living.
Md. Laws 1943, Ch. 8, repealed Md. Code (1939) Art. 19, Sec. 24, which
had required the Comptroller to see that the provisions for publication by
banks of unclaimed deposits and dividends had been complied with. The
1935 legislature had passed an act for turning over to the State unclaimed
bank deposits, but Governor Nice vetoed it.
23 Consider also Md. Laws 1943, Ch. 31, the purpose of which is to provide for notifying the Alien Property Custodian of any proceedings involving property in which notice is required to be made upon a non-resident
2 4 of Maryland in an enemy country.
Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 19.
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the latter is civilly void,25 even though the re-marrying
spouse is not punishable.
With reference to criminal guilt, there is conflict among
the Anglo-American cases whether the common spouse who
re-marries within the seven year period in reliance on a
bona fide mistaken belief in the actual death of the absent
spouse should be convicted. The well-known English case
of Regina v. Tolson26 allowed mistake of fact as a defense
in this "Enoch Arden" situation, although the weight of
American authority, including a Maryland dictum, 27 is
contra and allows a conviction de~pite the mistake.
A different problem arises in civil litigation involving
an allegedly bigamous marriage. In the Maryland case
of Schaffer v. Richardson,8 a man, once married to a first
wife, left her, and years later married a second wife (during the lifetime of the first). The case created a presumption, from the fact of the second marriage ceremony by
a person once earlier married, that the first marriage had
been terminated, either by a divorce, or by the death of
the impediment spouse. While on its facts the Schaffer
case directly involved only a presumption that the common
spouse had obtained a divorce somewhere in his wanderings,29 yet the other part of the whole presumption represents a well established rule capable of solving uncertainty
as to the death vel non of a first (and otherwise impediment) spouse whose survival is in doubt.
The rules set out above have been concerned with resolving uncertainties as to death vel non at the time of
the litigation, or of death vel non before a given prior date
which may be significant. The law has not been as quick
to resolve problems in the second group, the exact date of
death of one known or assumed to be dead.
While some jurisdictions have refined the common law
presumption of death from seven years absence so as to
make it a presumption that the absentee actually died on
the terminal day of the period, yet the majority merely
make it mean that the absentee is taken for being dead as
25 See Note, Interstate Recognition of Marriage (1943)
7 Md. L. Rev.
254, and an interesting case cited therein on the civil validity of an "Enoch
Arden" marriage, Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4
S. D. (2d) 364, 127 A. L. R. 430 (1939), noted (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev. 529.
2023 Q. B. D. 168 (1889).
27 Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 458, 107 A. 185 (1919).
2289 125 Md. 88, 93 A. 391, L. R. A. 1915E 186 (1915).
'The first wife in the Schaffer case actually lived until, after the husband's second marriage, in fact she, after that marriage, herself obtained a
divorce from the husband, but that divorce was not in time to save the
validity of the husband's second marriage of its own force.
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of the end of the period if that fact (otherwise proved)
would establish whatever claim is asserted."0
It is hard to say how Maryland stands on this matter.
The language of some cases,"t including recent ones, would
seem to put Maryland in the former group, as holding for
a presumption that death occurs on the terminal day of
the period, rather than merely that the subject is then
dead, the exact date of death being unknown. But, the2
actual decision in the older case of Schaub v. Griffin3
would seem to refute this and make the presumption, at
most, mean that the subject is taken for dead at the end
of the seven year period, without deciding whether death
occurred then or earlier. Schaub v. Griffin was the only
case in which the exact date of death of one presumed
to be then dead after seven years was relevant. In all
the others, where the presumption could have applied at
all, it would have sufficed to hold the subjects merely dead
in fact, without reference to the exact date. So it can be
said that the language to the effect that death occurs at
the very end of the period is but dictum, and, being inconsistent with the decision in the Schaub case, the latter
must prevail.2 2
In that case, a father and son both disappeared, the
father being heard from last: Before the seven year period
30 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1926) Sec. 291.
31 Robb v. Horsey, 169 Md. 227, 235, 181 A. 348 (1935), "presumed that

death occurred immediately upon the expiration of the period"; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers v. Nash, 144 Md. 623, 638-9,
125 A. 441 (1924), "the presumption . . . is not that he died within that
period, but immediately upon the expiration of it"; Tilly v. Tilly, 2 B1.
436, 444 (1830), "may be assumed to have happened just seven years after
the day on which it is shown by proof that he was last heard of"; the preceding quotation from the Tilly case was quoted in Shriver and Dwyer v.
State, use of Reister, 65 Md. 278, 287, 4 A. 679 (1886) ; English v. U. S..
25 F. (2d) 335 (D. C. Md., 1928), "well established in Maryland that the
presumption of death . . . is not that he died within that period, but immediately upon the expiration of it."
2 84 Md. 557, 36 A. 443 (1897). Oddly enough, several of the cases cited
in the preceding footnote cite Schaub v. Griffin to the effect that the presumption is that death actually occurred on the terminal day of the period.
Neither the decision nor the language justifies this. The opinion specifically says, 84 Md. 564, ". . . there arises therefrom no presumption of
the time thereof, and therefore if it be required to establish the precise
period of death, it must be done by evidence." And see Sprigg v. Moale,
28 Md. 497, 506 (1868) ". . . we think it clear that it (the fact of death)
may be presumed to have happened before the bringing of this suit . . .
though there is no legal presumption of the period when death occurred,
or up to which life endured." See 2 Alex. Br. Stat. (Coe's Ed., 1912) *503504.
82, The opinion in Tilly v. Tilly, 8upra, n. 31, is obscure, and one possible
interpretation of it is that it was material to fix the exact day of the
absentee's death. If so, the case was impliedly overruled by the later
Schaub case, where there was a clear need for exactly dating the death.
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had run as to either, the death of a third person left property to the father for life, with a vested remainder to the
son, but if he died without issue before the father died,
then to the father outright. Seven years after the death of
the third person, in litigation over the property, the Court
awarded it to the estate of the son, both father and son
being presumed dead. The Court refused to presume that
the son died first merely because the father was heard
from the more recently, and decided the case on the basis
of both father and son being in fact dead, the exact dates
of death being unknown. On this basis, the son's estate being vested, subject to be divested by proof of his dying during the father's lifetime, it was impossible for those claiming under the father to sustain the burden of proving his
survival of the son, and so the estate of the son prevailed.
But, if there be a Maryland rule that the seven year
presumption determines that the subject's death presumptively occurred at the very end of the period, then a contrary result should have been reached in the Schaub case.
Inasmuch as the father was heard from the more recently,
the seven year period had not run as to him until after
it had as to the son. Therefore, the son should have been
presumed to have died in fact at the end of his seven year
period, and before the end of the father's, when he would
have been presumed to have later died. But that was not
the decision in the case. Thus it is submitted that the true
Maryland rule is that the subject is merely presumed to
be dead at the end of the period, not necessarily to have
died on that very day.
The Schaub case poses an interesting question which
can arise under the wording of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act (not then in force) which is next to be discussed
on the third problem of simultaneous death. Is that statute
broad enough to cover establishing the sequence of two
deaths, the exact date of at least one of which is uncertain,
where they did not result from a common disaster or other
single event? Suppose, for instance, in the Lachowicz case
(where the decedent died in August, 1941), proof can later
be mustered that the Polish brother died childless "sometime in 1941"? Will the Act's provision that the property
of "each shall be disposed of as if he had survived" be
invoked to entitle the claimant cousins to receive distribution? The statute could not have presently aided the solution of the Lachowicz case for it can, at best, apply only
when both deaths are known to have occurred in fact.
Proof is yet lacking that the Polish cousin has ever died.
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A study of the history of the drafting of the Act by
the Uniform Laws Commissioners discloses that, as promulgated, it was intended to apply to any question of the
sequence of deaths, whether arising out of a common disaster or otherwise. As first tentatively drafted, it applied
only to multiple deaths in a common disaster, and its original title so indicated.33 But, after a question had been
raised by one of the Commissioners34 as to the desirability
of making it apply to any problem of sequence of deaths,
the title was changed to the present one, and the key phrase
bringing it into operation was fixed as "no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously."
Even aside from this history of its drafting, the very
words themselves should show an intent not to limit it
to deaths in common disaster. There is just as much of
a need for resolving the mystery of the sequence of two or
more disconnected deaths, as for those all of which occur
out of the same event. It is but accidental that most issues
of this kind happen to involve a common disaster.
Legal solution of this third type of problem, that of
determining the sequence of multiple known deaths, has
had an interesting history in Maryland, culminating in
the adoption of the Uniform Act in 1941 (by Chapter 191,
adding Article 35, Sections 89 to 96, and repealing the old
Section 89).
The well known Maryland case of Cowman v. Rogers"
arose out of the Johnstown flood of 1889. In that case
there was an insurance policy on the life of the husband
payable to the wife, but if she pre-deceased the husband,
then to certain others under the regulations of the society,
the first class being his children. The husband, the wife,
and their children all perished in the flood, but there was
no proof of the sequence of the deaths. The fund was
33 At the 1936 stage of its drafting it was called the "Uniform Death in
Common Disaster Act", see 1936 Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 228, as it was still called in 1937
Handbook, 245. In the 1938 Handbook, 294, it was called by a lengthy
name emphasizing that ". . . there is no evidence of the relative times of
their deaths" without mention of common disaster, as it was called in the
1939 Handbook, 191. Finally, in 1940 Handbook, 267, it was given its
present name.
", 1938 Handbook, 276-277, notes that: "The gentleman from Wisconsin
[Commissioner Brossard] very pertinently suggested that there might be
more than two persons perish in a common disaster, and that they might
have died in disasters which were not common and under circumstances
which were not disasters."
',73 Md. 403, 21 A. 64, 10 L. R. A. 550 (1891).
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claimed by an heir of the husband, by the administrator
of the wife, and by the administrator of the children. The
trial court awarded it to the administrator of the children,
but the Court of Appeals reversed and awarded it to the
administrator of the wife.
It was held that there was no common law presumption
of survivorship when there were deaths in a common disaster, and that the wife had a prima facie title to the fund
under the terms of the policy, to be divested only by a
showing that she died in the life-time of the husband.
Thus other claimants than the wife's estate had the burden
(impossible of being sustained) of showing the necessary
deaths prior to the husband's, failing which their claims
had to be rejected.
The advent (temporary or otherwise) of the automobile
brought more sharply into focus this question of the sequence of multiple deaths in a common disaster. In McComas v. Wiley, 6 decided in 1919, the problem was that
of the sequence of deaths of husband and wife, both fatally
injured in a collision between an auto and an express
train. The Court followed Cowman v. Rogers, and placed
the burden on the person asserting a claim based on a certain sequence of events." From conflicting evidence, the
Court found that the wife had survived the husband.
The Legislature of 1920 attempted the first statutory
solution of this question of the sequence of deaths in a
common disaster, and enacted provisions which greatly
resembled those of the Code Napoleon, mentioned in the
opinion in Cowman v. Rogers. These were found in Article
35, Section 89 of the 1939 Code. Under it, differences as
to age and sex were determinative of the
artificial solutions
8
of the questions of sequence of death.
134 Md. 572, 108 A- 196 (1919).
37 Somewhat the same technique was used in Schaub v. Griffin, 84 Md.
557, 36 A. 443 (1895), which involved both a problem of the sequence of
two deaths and the use of the presumption of death from seven years absence
as to both persons. Both a father and a son had disappeared. Thereafter,
but before the seven year period had run as to either, the death of a third
person left property so that the father became entitled to a life interest If
he then survived, with the son entitled to a vested remainder in the same,
but if he died without issue before his father, then the father took all.
Litigation developed seven years after the death of the third person. It
was held that both were presumed dead, the life interest of the father
terminated, and the money should be distributed to the next of kin of the
son, after an administrator should be appointed to receive it for them.
The Court said that the remainder never passed to the father for absence
of proof of his surviving the son, and the life Interest in the father
terminated with his (presumed) death, and, the son being presumed dead,
his interest passed to next of kin.
88 The ages of 15 and 60 were fixed as demarcating children and aged
persons from persons of normal adult age. The elder of children and the
38
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One case went to the Court of Appeals under this statute, Sporrer v. Addy, 39 and it held that the statute applied
only if there was a complete lack of evidence as to which
died first, and of circumstances from which that could be
inferred. 0 The Court affirmed the finding of the Chancellor, on conflicting evidence, that the wife had died first,
where both husband and wife were fatally injured in the
same automobile accident, were taken to different hospitals, and were both dead upon arrival.4 No doubt a
similar interpretation will be made of the Maryland version
of the Uniform Act, which applies only if there is "no
sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise
than simultaneously."
Where the 1920 statute resolved uncertainties as to the
sequence of deaths in terms of presumptions, the recently
adopted Uniform Act, which repeals the 1920 statute, 2 uses
different terminology, although in some instances it does
accomplish the effect of a presumption one way or the
other.
The statutory solutions are stated to be applicable only
where the particular will, trust, deed, or insurance policy
itself has no provision to handle the problem of uncertainty
as to sequence of deaths. There is a general clause providing, as to situations not otherwise dealt with in the
Act, that where title to property depends on priority of
death, each person's property shall be disposed of as if
he had survived the others whose deaths are in the picture.
Where two or more are to take successively under another's disposition of property, the property is to be divided
younger of aged persons were presumed to have survived; a child was
presumed to have survived an aged person; persons of normal adult age
were presumed to have survived either children or aged persons; between
fifteen and sixty, the male was presumed to survive the female; and if of
the same sex, the younger to have survived the older.
"150 Md. 60, 132 A. 376 (1926).
See Note, Gommorientes Act, 1939-An Act Respecting Survivorship in
Common Disaster (1943) 1 Vancouver Advocate 27, mentioning the application of a Canadian statute to a situation of death of two persons by
asphyxiation. The note mentions that "great care must be exercised in
ascertaining that 'doubt exists'."
41

See

HAYS, CrTY LAWYER

(1942) 444-456, describing the case of the

Estate of Christian Channing Gross, where the litigation concerned which
of the persons fatally injured in an auto accident died first.
"1There apparently had been dissatisfaction with the 1920 Maryland
statute, antedating its repeal by the Uniform Act. See 1939 Handbook
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 76,
where the late Alexander Armstrong, Esq., Commissioner from Maryland,
protested delay in promulgating the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
on the ground that the Maryland State Bar Association's Committee on
Laws had postponed its own action in the matter, awaiting the promulgation of the Uniform Act. On this, see 44 Transactions Maryland State
Bar Association (1939) 14, 15-16.
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into as many portions as there are successive beneficiaries,
and each share is to be distributed as if that beneficiary
survived. In the case of joint tenancies and tenancies by
the entirety, the property is to be distributed in two or
more shares, each to go as if the one concerned had survived.
If the deaths of both insured and beneficiary of an
insurance policy are in question, the proceeds are to be
distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary.
This last rule, of course, is exactly contra the result
achieved by Cowman v. Rogers. It, in effect, creates a
presumption of the beneficiary's dying first, as does the
general clause first set out above, of the owner's surviving
all his heirs.
The principal technique which we have seen the law
to have adopted in its various and sundry attempts to
resolve uncertainties as to the fact and time of death has
been that of the presumption. In fact, the Maryland Court,
in Cowman v. Rogers, after stating that there was no
common law presumption of survivorship in common disaster, in effect resolved the problem substantially that way
through a special burden of proof, by holding the named
beneficiary's interest to be quasi-vested, so that the special
burden was placed on those claiming through non-survivorship to prove it. This achieved the same substantial
result as if it had been presumed that the named beneficiary survived the insured, contra the present rule under
the Uniform Act.
The more recent statutory changes have been in the
direction away from presumptions to either (1) the setting
up of procedures to handle the question, or (2) a sharing
of the proceeds among those respectively, who might have
taken exclusive interests if the uncertainty as to the fact
of death were capable of normal resolution in their favors,
respectively. The principal contribution of the Uniform
Absent Persons Act is to provide a technique for handling
the absentee's property during his absence, from the very
start, without having to wait some lengthy period before
anything can be done about it. It may be that the general
common law presumption of death from seven years absence, still extant as to other proceedings than those under
the Uniform Act, will largely fall into disuse for the reason
that specific handling has been made of the problem with
reference to the two issues (property, marriage) where
that directly arises. Special rules handle the problem in
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both civil and criminal aspects of bigamy law; and the
Uniform Act is probably meant to be exclusive as a way
of resolving property claims where one once established
to be owner disappears. The statute which was applied
in the principal case affords the technique for resolving
doubts as to whether an absentee lived long enough to
inherit property subject to Maryland administration. For
that matter, the other 1941 statute, aimed at keeping such
property from Nazi confiscation, itself can handle the problem whether a foreign beneficiary who did survive a Maryland decedent is still alive in order personally to enjoy
the proceeds. It is not likely that there will be much
remaining litigation in which the common law presumption of43death from seven years' absence can have application.
The Uniform Act handling of the simultaneous death
problem is superior to either the common law one or that
of the 1920 Maryland statute. It should be interpreted
so that it applies to resolve doubt as to the sequence of
any two known deaths, regardless whether arising out of
the same transaction. Thus it will partially fill a gap the
common law had and still has, that of fixing the exact date
of death of a person known or assumed to be dead. For
it would solve that latter problem as to the date of an
uncertain death by relation to a certainly dated one, at
least as to sequence.
Whether it is desirable to work out any specific rule
for exactly dating a single death, known to have happened
at some time, and without reference to any other death
is a debatable matter. It could be argued, of course, that
it is as desirable to resolve the problem of the exact date
of a single death as it is to fix the sequence of two deaths
or to determine the fact of being dead.
Be that as it may, the Lachowicz case, in the light of
the recent statutory changes and the current world conditions, affords an interesting opportunity herein to set into
a pattern the dozen or so legal propositions that have arisen
out of a groping for devices to solve uncertainty as to the
fact and time of death.
"8At first glance it might be thought possible to use the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Md. Code (1939) Art. 31A, to settle uncertainty as to
whether an absent person is dead. But, both because of its possible conflict in this regard with the Uniform Absent Persons Act, and because of
the impossibility of obtaining service of process on the absentee, this seems
unlikely.

